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1 Introduction
The ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-2009 has revived researchers' interest in mon-
etary policy transmission through the banking sector by raising the ques-
tion whether low levels of interest rates induce excessive risk-taking in the
ﬁnancial sector. Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012) claim that since mone-
tary policy aﬀects ﬁnancial institutions' balance sheets through asset prices,
monetary policy has direct eﬀects on ﬁnancial stability. They further state
 Policy rules that ignore ﬁnancial stability fail to lean against the build
up of imbalances and systemic risk in normal times and are not credible
in crisis times. Several times ﬁnancial turmoil has forced central banks to
intervene in markets to stabilize ﬁnancial sector, potentially compromising
long-run price stability. (Brunnermeier and Sannikov 2012, 34)
In the same vein, Borio and Zhu (2012) argue that the potential existence
of a so-called risk-taking channel poses a problem to monetary policy. If it
exists but is ignored, unsustainable economic expansions may show up ﬁrst
in the form of ﬁnancial imbalances rather than in the form of rising inﬂation.
Even though literature related to diﬀerent banking channels has evolved
rather rapidly in recent years1, surprisingly little attention has been paid to
the institutional features underlying the risky behavior. Understanding the
mechanism at work is a prerequisite for succesful intervention. In addition,
macro-level studies on this important topic are rather scarse. Financial inter-
mediaries' risk-taking behavior as a transmission channel for monetary policy
and its macro-economic impact in the US has been studied by Adrian and
Shin (2010), Adrian, Moench and Shin (2010), and more recently Bruno and
Shin (2013). The need for a better understanding of the risk-taking chan-
nel of monetary policy has also been recognized by Monacelli (2012), and
recently by Bayomi, Dell'Ariccia, Habermeier, Mancini-Griﬀoli and Valencia
(2014), who discuss the new shape of monetary policy after the crisis. As the
future of central banking, monetary policy and ﬁnancial stability is widely
debated right now, this paper contributes to a discussion of direct practical
relevance.
In order to ﬁll in the gap in the literature, the present paper takes the
empirical analysis of Adrian, Moench and Shin (2010) as a benchmark to
assess empirically the macroeconomic impact of the link between monetary
policy, banks' balance sheet managment and measures of risk. The empirical
1See Section 2 for a literature review.
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analysis in Adrian et al. is based on a theoretical model due to Shin (2010),
which explicitly focuses on the behavior of the banking sector and illustrates
that the ﬁnancial intermediary sector has an active role in the business cycle
through the pricing of risk. Shin's (2010) theoretical model suggests the
following mechanism: monetary policy induced balance sheet adjustment by
ﬁnancial intermediaries leads to a lower price of risk and higher real activity
in the economy. Empirical assesment of this mechanism is the main interest
of this paper.
The vector autoregression (VAR) and impulse response (IR) -analysis of
Adrian et al. (2010) indicates that there is a connection between rapid growth
of intermediary balance sheets, lower risk premiums and higher real activity.
For methodological reasons however, as acknowledged by the authors, the
results from nonstructural VARs cannot be taken as conclusive (Adrian et al.
2010, 197). As is commonly done, Choleski decomposition is used to identify
the economic shocks and IRs of interest. Since there is not enough theory
to determine a correct ordering for the variables, the ordering is essentially
arbitrary. This is of concern because in a recursively identiﬁed model with
zero restrictions on the impact eﬀects, the ordering of the variables in the
VAR matters for the results. Without further identifying restrictions one
cannot be sure that the shocks and IRs tell us about the underlying economic
processes we are essentially interested in − in this case, whether the balance
sheet mechanism postulated by the theory is backed up by data. This gives
reason for further research.
Lanne and Lütkepohl (2008, 2010) and Rigobon (2003) among others
have pointed out that sometimes statistical properties of the data can yield
further information for identiﬁcation in an SVAR framework. Even when
economic theory suﬃces to identify the shocks of interest, often there is no
over-identifying information to test theories against data. Examples of such
statistical properties are residual distribution and structural breaks. For
example, Rigobon (2003), Lanne and Lütkepohl (2008), Lanne, Lütkepohl
and Maciejowska (2010) and Lütkepohl and Net²unajev (2013) have exploited
residual heteroskedasticity to extract further identifying information from the
data. Rigobon (2003) and Lanne and Lütkepohl (2008) assume that changes
in the volatility of shocks are determined exogeneously and partition the
sample period accordingly, while Lanne et al. (2010) as well as Lütkepohl and
Net²unajev (2013) model the changes in volatility endogenously as Markov
switching (MS) regimes.
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Since theories on the risk-taking channel are relatively scarce (Dell'Arriccia,
Laeven and Marquez 2013, Diamond and Rajan 2012, Disyatat 2011, Shin
2010), there is not much additional theory to put structure in the empiri-
cal model. Therefore statistical identiﬁcation strategies are clearly invoked.
This paper applies the approach by Lanne and Lütkepohl (2010), where shock
identiﬁcation is based on nonnormality of the residuals. The residuals are
assumed to follow a mixture of two normal distributions where, similarly
to the MS approach, the regimes cannot be determined beforehand but are
assigned endogenously. In addition to being relatively simple, the chosen
method allows to exploit the fact that in applied work VAR residuals are
often found to be nonnormal (Lanne and Lütkepohl 2010). For the data at
hand, normality of residuals was strongly rejected by statistical tests, which
supports the proposed identiﬁcation strategy.2 Hence the nonnormality of
residuals can be exploited to test whether the just-identifying restrictions
of the benchmark paper are consistent with the data. Testing the imposed
restrictions against the data enables one to get rid of arbitrary restrictions
and, more importantly, to test empirically the relationship of interest.
Even though the Lanne and Lütkepohl (2010) method only guarantees a
statistical identiﬁcation i.e. it delivers orthogonalized shocks but does not
give an economic interpretation, the method allows us to perform a statistical
test to ﬁnd a recursive ordering, which is not rejected by the data. The
statistical identiﬁcation of shocks enables us to learn about the impact eﬀects
between the variables from the data instead of ruling out some of the eﬀects ex
ante. Although diﬀerent from the benchmark paper, the ordering supported
by the data is compatible with the suggested mechanism. However, based on
the resulting impulse responses, there is no strong and signiﬁcant evidence
for the risk-taking channel during the sample period.
The contribution of the present paper is twofold. First, a recent econo-
metric methodology is applied to VAR. The study by Adrian et al. (2010)
is reconsidered and the issue of shock identiﬁcation is addressed. The previ-
ously imposed indentifying restrictions can be tested against the data. This
is important to properly assess the dynamic properties of the variables and
to conclude whether the mechanism suggested by the theory is backed up by
empirical evidence. Second, it complements existing studies with macro dy-
namics between monetary policy, ﬁnancial intermediary sector and the least
studied monetary policy transmission channel, the risk-taking channel.
2See Section 4 for details.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 a brief overview
of the literature on monetary policy transmission through the banking sector
is given. Technical details of the empirical method are put forward in Section
3. Section 4 covers the empirical analysis and Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Literature on monetary policy transmission through the banking sector can
be subdivided into two broad categories. The line of research following
Bernanke and Getler (1995) emphasizes the channel through demand for
credit and borrowers' balance sheet, while the bank lending channel studied
by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) focuses on the impact of policy rate on credit
supply. In both cases banking sector is put at the heart of monetary policy
transmission. The transmission channel studied here has common features
with the latter branch of research: interest lies in the passage of the policy
rate through the asset side of the banks' balance sheets.
What makes these two channels distinct however is the mechanism that
links the policy rate to banks' balance sheets. In Bernanke and Blinder (1992)
it is binding reserve requirements of commercial banks. According to Adrian
and Shin (2010), this approach is not applicable to the current crisis because
reserve requirements have not been binding (e.g. Martin, McAndrews and
Skeie 2012, 1) and because credit contraction did not originate from the
commercial banking sector. Shin (2010) shows theoretically how ﬁnancial
intermediaries actively manage their balance sheets in response to changes
in the market-determined risk premium, which in turn adjusts to changes in
the monetary policy interest rate. This suggests that the mechanism linking
the policy rate and the asset side of the balance sheets is the pricing of risk.
This mechanism has been called the risk-taking channel of monetary policy
(Borio and Zhu 2012, 242).
The link between monetary policy and risk-taking behavior of commercial
banks has been theoretically studied by Dell'Arriccia, Laeven and Marquez
(2013), Diamond and Rajan (2012), Disyatat (2011). Empirical research ﬁrst
started in the U.S. (Lown and Morgan 2006, Adrian and Shin 2009, Adrian,
Moench and Shin 2010) but was soon extended to the countries of the Euro
area (Jimenez, Onenga, Peydró and Saurina 2014, Altunbas, Gambacorta
and Marquez-Ibanez 2010, Maddaloni and Peydró 2011). A common ﬁnding
of the empirical studies at the micro level is that lax monetary policy in-
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creases the riskiness of new loans by commercial banks. Using an extremely
large, conﬁdential micro-level data set for Spain Jimenez et al. (2014) ﬁnd,
that in an environment of low interest rates, the riskiness of bank portfo-
lios is aﬀected by both higher collateral values and search for yield. In the
short run, the default probability of bank loans decreases, while it is found
to increase in the long run when the search for yield eﬀect prevails. Building
on this Altunbas et al. (2010) construct various proxies for bank default
risk and analyze a panel dataset that covers banks operating in 16 OECD
countries. They ﬁnd that interest rates below the Taylor rule increase the
default probability of banks. Maddaloni and Peydró (2011) use the European
Central Bank's Bank Lending Survey to explore the determinants of bank
lending standards in the Euro Area. According to their panel regression a
monetary expansion leads to lower credit standards for both corporate and
personal loans. More recently De Santis and Surico (2013) have studied het-
erogeneity of bank lending across euro area countries. They use BankScope
data in panel regressions, and focus on heterogeneity across four countries
and bank typologies. The results indicate that the bank lending channel in
the eurozone is highly heterogeneous. Finally, Buch, Eichenmeier and Pri-
eto (2011) use a factor-augmented vector autoregressive (FAVAR) model for
macro-level data for the U.S. and ﬁnd that small domestic banks respond
to expansionary monetary shock by increasing the amount of risky loans,
but there is no evidence of increased risk-taking for the banking system as a
whole. The authors suspect that aggregate data might mask diﬀerences at
the banking group level.
These examples of research done to date show some of the empirical chal-
lenges in studying the topic. First, irrespectively of the empirical approach,
all research on monetary policy has to come to terms with the endogeneity
of policy rates. Second, the concept of risk is unobservable, hence hard to
measure, and can be deﬁned in a variety of ways. Third, sometimes data on
important variables is conﬁdential so that only people working at e.g. central
banks have access to it, or it can be nonexistent like data on variations in
the supply of bank loans not driven by changes in demand. Some samples
are also quite small, such as data coming from surveys. The availability of
data in turn sets restrictions on the empirical methodology.
According to Borio and Zhu (2012, 245), the risk-taking channel has al-
ways existed but its importance may have increased for two reasons. First,
the ﬁnancial system has evolved in a way that incentivizes the use of external
ﬁnance and leverage. As a consequence, spending decisions are more driven
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by wealth and risk than previously. Second, current accounting practices
based on fair value measures (as opposed to historical cost accounting) are
more sensitive to changes in interest rates and risk premia.
These observations are consistent with Adrian and Shin (2009) and Allen
and Carletti (2010), who argue that nowadays capital markets play a crucial
role in the supply of credit to the economy. The former provide empiri-
cal evidence that among all ﬁnancial intermediaries it was credit supply by
market-based intermediaries,3 not traditional commercial banks that saw the
most rapid growth before the crisis - as well as the most dramatic contraction
afterwards. Because the main source of funding for market-based interme-
diaries is short term borrowing through repurchase agreements or issuance
of commercial paper, the funding is highly sensitive to changes in capital
markets. Moreover, their balance sheets being marked-to-market, asset price
changes translate immediately into changes in their net worth. On the other
hand, most of the liabilities are long term. Since the business of these insti-
tutions is to borrow short term and lend long term, the spread between the
short and long term interest rates is indicative of their expected proﬁts. This
is in contrast to the traditional view, where a bank is thought to intermediate
between depositors and borrowers and the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy
is assessed by its impact on long rates only. If the supply of credit in the
US economy has shifted from the traditional banking sector to market-based
institutions, the distinction between the two has to be taken into account in
an empirical study of monetary policy transmission and its macroeconomic
impact.
A central element of the risk-taking channel is changing perceptions and
attitudes towards risk and risk premia (Borio and Zhu 2012, 247). Accord-
ingly, in the theoretical model due to Shin (2010), monetary policy induced
balance sheet adjustment by ﬁnancial intermediaries leads to a lower price of
risk and higher real activity in the economy. Since default as well as lending
and borrowing between ﬁnancial intermediaries are ruled out in the model,
ﬂuctuations in the price of risk cannot arise from chains of default. When
asset prices change e.g. due to monetary policy changes, in addition to the
normal valuation eﬀect there is an additional quantity adjustment of balance
sheets. This sets in motion the amplifying eﬀect of ﬁnancial intermediaries
3Market-based intermediaries include broker-dealers, issuers of asset-backed securities,
ﬁnance companies and funding corporations, the last three of which are called shadow
banks. See Appendix for further details.
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on the boom-bust cycle. The mechanism has been empirically assessed by
Adrian et al. (2010), who ﬁnd a connection between rapid growth of inter-
mediary balance sheets, lower risk premiums and higher real activity. Bruno
and Shin (2013) further suggest that banking sector leverage is a candidate
channel for the transmission of monetary policy to exchange rate changes.
3 SVAR Model with Nonnormal Residuals to
Test Identiﬁcation Restrictions
Following Lütkepohl (2007, Ch 9), consider ﬁrst a standard K -dimensional
reduced form stable VAR with p lags:
yt = A1yt−1 + · · ·+ Apyt−p + ut (1)
where yt is a (K × 1) vector of observable time series variables, the Aj's
(j = 1 ,..., p) are (K ×K) coeﬃcient matrices and the error term ut is K -
dimensional white noise with ut∼(0,Σu) . In the presentation of this section
deterministic terms are excluded since they don't aﬀect structural modelling
and impulse response functions. Since a VAR is a system of simultaneous
equations, all variables are endogenous and the error terms in diﬀerent equa-
tions are likely to be correlated. Usually the purpose is to conduct impulse
response analysis, which means representing a stationary VAR -process in
the following Wold MA form:
yt = ut + Φ1ut−1 + Φ2ut−2 + ... (2)
where
Φs =
∑s
j=1 Φs−jAj, s = 1, 2, ... with Φ0 = Ik (3)
Interest then lies in the elements of the Φj, the MA coeﬃcient matrices,
which contain the impulse responses of the system: responses of a variable to
an impulse in another. If the error terms are contemporaneously correlated
− Σu is not a diagonal matrix − it means that shocks come in a bunch. In
this case setting all other error terms to zero to trace out single impulses
can be misleading. Impulses may not correctly reﬂect the relations between
the variables in the VAR. On the other hand if the error terms of diﬀerent
variables are uncorrelated then it is reasonable to assume that a shock occurs
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in one variable at a time. Therefore orthogonalizing the error terms implies
identifying single shocks and impulses.
In a so-called B-model (see Lütkepohl 2007, chapter 9), to orthogonalize
the error term of the reduced form model means deriving shocks εt ∼ (0,IK)
such that ut = Bεt. In other words we want to ﬁnd a matrix B such that
εt = B
−1ut (4)
and
E(utu
′
t) = Σu = BΣεB
′ = BB′. (5)
As the covariance matrix is symmetric, these equations only deﬁne K(K+1)
2
equations, while B contains K2 elements. Hence K2 − K(K+1)
2
= K(K−1)
2
ad-
ditional restrictions on B are needed to identify all of its K2 elements. A
common choice of B is a lower triangular matrix obtained from a Choleski
decomposition of Σu because it yields exactly the right number of restric-
tions. This is done by decomposing the covariance matrix Σu as Σu = PP
′
where P is a lower triangular matrix. Then by deﬁning P = B and Θi =
ΦiP (i = 0, 1, 2, ...) one obtains shocks εt = P
−1ut and the corresponding
VMA representation
yt = Θ0ε0 + Θ1ε1 + Θ2ε2 + .... (6)
Since the components of εt are uncorrelated with unit variance, it is possible
to interpret the jk -th element of the matrix Θi as capturing the eﬀect on
variable j of a unit shock in variable k that occured i periods ago. This
identiﬁcation strategy based on Choleski decomposition is easily and often
used. However the B matrix obtained with Choleski decomposition depends
on the order of the variables in the vector yt. This implies that there can
be several triangular matrices that do the orthogonalization equally well.
Moreover as the B matrix contains instantaneous eﬀects of the shocks on the
variables (Θ0 = B), diﬀerent choices of B can yield diﬀerent results in terms
of impulse responses.
The fact that the choice of B has an impact on results means that non-
statistical information is needed to impose restrictions. This requires eco-
nomic theory that describes the relationships of interest. In the case of
Choleski decomposition this means determining, which variables do not have
an instantaneous impact on some others and then ordering the variables in
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the vector yt accordingly. Other popular identiﬁcation methods include the
use of inequality or sign restrictions (Canova and De Nicolò, 2002; Uhlig,
2005), where a whole variety of shocks of a predetermined sign are admitted,
or the exclusion of instantaneous or long-run eﬀects of variables (Blanchard
and Quah, 1989; Lütkepohl 2005), where zero eﬀects of some variables are
assumed. The resulting VARs with restrictions on the transformation matrix
obtained from economic theory are called structural VARs. In the B-model
the error terms ut of the estimable reduced form VAR are seen as linear
functions of some meaningful economic disturbances, εt, called structural
shocks. In other words the information content of reduced form dynamics is
transformed into behavioral ones.
A common feature of all these identiﬁcation strategies is that they identify
the structural shocks but do not allow the identiﬁcation to be statistically
tested. Without further identifying restrictions one cannot be sure that the
shocks and IRs tell us about the underlying economic processes we are es-
sentially interested in. Furthermore sometimes there is not enough economic
theory to obtain a full set of restrictions in which case arbitrary restrictions
are imposed.
Instead, if there is reason to believe, or there is evidence from a VAR
analysis that residuals might not be normally distributed, then this informa-
tion may be useful for identiﬁcation. The residual distribution might have
heavy tails and produce outliers, which can be thought to be generated by
a diﬀerent distribution - from a diﬀerent stochastically generated regime. By
modelling a more general distribution explicitly, further identifying informa-
tion can be extracted (Lanne and Lütkepohl, 2010.)
Consider again the reduced form VAR reported above. As in the model
proposed by Lanne and Lütkepohl (2010), now assume the k -dimensional
error term ut to be a mixture of two serially independent normal random
vectors
ut =
{
e1t ∼ N(0,Σ1) with probability γ
e2t ∼ N(0,Σ2) with probability 1− γ
(7)
whereN(0,Σ) denotes a multivariate normal distribution with zero mean and
covariance matrix Σ. In the model Σ1 and Σ2 are (k×k) covariance matrices
that are assumed to be distinct, γ is the mixture probability, 0 < γ < 1, a
parameter of the model. γ is only identiﬁed if Σ1 6= Σ2 hence this is assumed
to hold. If some parts of Σ1 and Σ2 are identical then some components
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of ut may be normally distributed. In any case there only needs to be one
nonnormal component in ut. The distribution of the reduced form error term
now becomes
ut ∼ (0, γΣ1 + (1− γ)Σ2) (8)
The distributional assumption for ut allows to deﬁne a locally unique matrix
B in the following way. As shown in the Appendix A by Lanne and Lütkepohl
(2010), a diagonal matrix Ψ = diag(ψ1,..., ψk), ψi > 0 (i = 1, ..., k) and a
(k × k) matrix W exist such that Σ1 = WW ′ and Σ2 = WΨW ′ and W is
locally unique except for a change in sign of a column, as long as all ψi's are
distinct. Now we can rewrite the covariance matrix of the reduced form error
vector ut as
Σu = γWW
′ + (1− γ)WΨW ′ = W (γIk + (1− γ)Ψ)W ′ (9)
Then following equation (5) a locally unique B is given by
B = W (γIn + (1− γ)Ψ)1/2 (10)
This choice of B means that the orthogonality of shocks is independent of
regimes. This can be seen by applying (5) to the covariance matrices as
B−1ΣuB−1 = Ik
B−1Σ1B−1 = (γIk + (1− γ)Ψ)−1
B−1Σ2B−1 = (γIk + (1− γ)Ψ)−1Ψ
(11)
As the equations in (11) are all diagonal matrices, the choice of B as in
(10) yields shocks that are orthogonal in both regimes.
The model is estimated with maximum likelihood (ML) method. Rewrit-
ing (1) in lag operator form
A(L)yt = ut (12)
where A(L) = In−A1(L)−· · ·−ApLp is a matrix polynomial in the lag opera-
tor L then the conditional distribution of yt given Yt−1 = (yt−1, yt−2, ..., yt−p+1)
can be written as
f(yt|Yt−1) = γdet(W )−1exp
{
−1
2
(A(L)yt)
′(WW ′)−1(A(L)yt)
}
+(1− γ)det(Ψ)−½det(W )−1exp
{
−1
2
(A(L)yt)
′ (WΨW ′)−1(A(L)yt)
} (13)
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Collecting all the parameters into the vector θ, the log-likelihood is simply
lT (θ) =
T∑
t=1
log f(yt|Yt−1) (14)
The log-likelihood function (14) can be maximized with standard nonlinear
optimization algorithms.
4 Empirical Analysis of Macro Dynamics: Risk
Appetite Vector Autoregression
4.1 The Data and the VAR Model
There are two important variables in the theoretical model due to Shin (2010)
that are diﬃcult to quantify: the price of risk in the economy and ﬁnancial
intermediaries' risk taking capacity. Adrian et al. (2010) manage to overcome
the problem by constructing two proxy variables. This enables empirical
analysis of the mechanism of interest.
The ﬁrst one is called Macro Risk Premium and it measures the hurdle
rate of return4 for new projects ﬁnanced in the economy. It reﬂects the
ease of credit conditions and is measured from yield spreads of ﬁxed income
securities. In this framework spreads are found to matter more that the level
of interest rate because the business of ﬁnancial intermediaries consists of
borrowing short term and lending long term. In other words spreads are
informative about the marginal proﬁtability of lending, or supplying a new
loan. Since there is credit risk involved with loans granted by banks, credit
spreads are also likely to aﬀect banks' decision to supply new loans. This
fact is exploited in the construction of the ﬁrst variable.
The second proxy variable is labelled Financial Intermediary Risk Ap-
petite Factor as it measures the looseness of ﬁnancial intermediary capital
constraints. In the theoretical model this corresponds to the shadow value of
capital in the leveraged intermediary sector, which gives the additional bank
proﬁt from one extra dollar of capital, or marginal proﬁt from expanding
the balance sheet. This variable is important as it enables to circumvent the
problem of measuring marginal loan supply. In fact one of the challenges
in the empirical assessment of the risk-taking channel is the nonexistence of
4Hurdle rate of return = minimum acceptable rate of return to accept a new project.
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data on extra loans supplied, i.e. the increase in loan supply not driven by
demand needed to study marginal eﬀects.
Since there are a variety of institutions that provide credit to the real
economy, the authors ﬁrst choose the institutions that are most important in
determining risk premiums. In the US those turn out to be broker-dealers and
shadow banks, whose liabilities are short term and marked to market. When
balance sheets are marked to market, funding conditions are more promptly
reﬂected in the balance sheets. This is mostly not the case with traditional
banks. These variables enable to study how monetary policy actions, that
aﬀect the risk taking capacity of banks, will lead to shifts in the supply of
credit to the economy. Hence balance sheet measures of these institutions
have been used in the analysis.
The same set of variables as well as the exactly same dataset analyzed by
Adrian, Moench and Shin (2010) is used here. The data consists of quarterly
US data for the period of 1985:1 - 2010:4 and it was provided by the authors.
The original source of data for GDP growth and PCE (Personal Consumption
Expenditures) inﬂation is Bureau of Economic Analysis, S&P's corporate
bond ratings are from Standard & Poor's, ﬁnancial institutions' balance sheet
measures are from Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds and the Federal Funds
target rate as well as Treasury constant maturity yields originate from H.15
Release of the Federal Reserve Board.
The proxy variables are contructed as ﬁtted values of the following re-
gressions
GDPgrowtht = Σ
7
i=1βiTreasurySpreadit
+Σ13i=8βiCorporateBondSpreadit + εt
(15)
where TreasurySpread = constant maturity yield - Federal Fund target rate
and CorporateBondSpread = Yield of a 10 yr. corporate bond for S&P's
AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B ratings - 10 yr. constant maturity yield. GDP
growth is measured as annual growth rate. Macro risk premium obtained in
this way is a weighted average of spreads, and the weights are given by the
regression coeﬃcients. This is viewed as a portfolio tracking GDP growth.
−4MacroRiskPremiumt =
Σ6i=1βiWi ∗ FinancialIntermediaryBalanceSheetQuantitiesit−4
−β74MacroRiskPremiumt−4 + β8GDPgrowtht−4 + εt
(16)
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where FinancialIntermediaryBalanceSheetQuantities = broker-dealer lever-
age and equity growth, shadow bank asset and equity growth, commercial bank
asset and equity growth and W=weights given by the relative size of total as-
sets for each intermediary. The dependent variable in the regression (16) is
the negative change in macro risk premium over one year, which captures
return to the premia. All dependent variables are lagged one year. Financial
intermediary risk appetite factor is then obtained as ﬁtted values of balance
sheet variables only, i.e. the lagged macro premium and GDP growth are
excluded.
The authors then consider the following ﬁve variable VAR:
 4gdpt : quarterly GDP growth
 pit : inﬂation
 FFRt : Federal Funds target rate
 mrpt: macro risk premium
 FIt : ﬁnancial intermediary risk appetite factor
4.2 Previous Identiﬁcation Restrictions
Identiﬁcation in the benchmark paper is obtained with the following exclusion
restrictions on the transformation matrix (B).
B =
∗ 0 0 0 0
∗ ∗ 0 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
(17)
The asterisks denote unrestricted elements and the zeros are imposed so that
B is lower triangular. The variable ordering
yt = (4gdpt, pit, FFRt,mrpt, F It)′ (18)
implies that a shock to GDP growth is allowed to have a contemporaneous
eﬀect on all other variables, whereas there is no instantaneous feedback ef-
fect from an impulse on ﬁnancial intermediary risk appetite to any of the
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variables. Is there a plausible economic interpretation for the exclusion re-
strictions required by the identiﬁcation scheme? The theoretical model due
to Shin (2010) illustrates how a positive shock to asset values, say a decrease
in short rates, that increases the capital buﬀer (equity) of banks, leads to a
lower risk premium and induces banks to take on additional debt to purchase
more risky securities, or to supply new loans. In the model, the amount of
risky assets on the balance sheets increases more than in the case of a mere
valuation eﬀect. An empirical hypothesis of interest could then be formu-
lated as the impact of monetary policy interest rate to the risk premium and
ﬁnancial intermediaries' risk taking capacity. Accordingly in (17) a shock
to federal funds target rate is allowed to aﬀect contemporaneously both the
macro risk premium and ﬁnancial intermediary risk appetite factor, and a
shock to macro risk premium is allowed to have a contemporaneous eﬀect on
risk appetite.
As Lütkepohl and Net²unajev (2013) point out, even in those cases where
restrictions are derived from generally accepted economic models, the empir-
ical and theoretical models do not necessarily coincide. As potential reasons
they name measurement errors, trend and/or seasonal adjustment, and ob-
servation frequency for the data that is diﬀerent from that of the teoretical
model. Moreover the variables in the empirical and theoretical models might
not perfectly coincide. In the present case the main challenge arises from
the frequency of the data. Is it likely that there is no feedback eﬀect from
the right to the left of (18) within the same quarter? Another source of
gap between the economic and empirical models stems from the fundamen-
tal diﬀerences between the two modelling approaches. A theoretical model
is bound to abstract from some eﬀects in order to describe relations within a
set of variables only. To avoid problems with omitted variables, an empirical
model on the other hand often requires the inclusion of variables outside of
the theoretical model that are known to be important in practice (Lütkepohl
and Net²unajev 2013). From this point of view, the inclusion of the ﬁrst two
variables in (18) is easy to justify.
Even without an appealing, justiﬁable theoretical reasoning a recursive
identiﬁcation scheme is convenient whenever there is only one shock of inter-
est, which can be ordered at the bottom of the variable list (18). In all other
cases identiﬁcation via recursive ordering as in (17) necessarily implies that
one is excluding certain impact eﬀects ex-ante rather than learning about
it from the data. As explained in Section 3, if it is reasonable to assume
that the vector of reduced form errors ut follows a mixed normal distribution
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with covariance matrix as in (9), and if the elements of the Ψ matrix are
all distinct, then these concerns become irrelevant since the validity of the
restrictions in (17) can be statistically tested (Lanne and Lütkepohl 2010).
QQ-plots of the residuals of the linear VAR(1) model is shown in Figure 2.
The plots feature a mostly linear pattern in the center of the data, while the
tails show departures from the ﬁtted line. Compared to a normal distribution,
a slightly more S-shaped curve emerges. This kind of distribution with heavy
tails and outliers can be captured by a mixture of normal distributions (Lanne
and Lütkepohl 2010, 159.). The outliers can be thought to be generated by
a diﬀerent distribution than the rest of the observations. Then identiﬁcation
of the shocks is obtained from heteroskedasticity across regimes. The results
of normality tests are reported in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Tests for normality of residuals
The Jarque-Bera test rejects the null hypothesis of normality for each of
the estimated residuals. The high overall kurtosis of the Doornik-Hansen
(1994) test for multivariate normality yields further support for the mixture
distribution. Hence formal tests support the proposed identiﬁcation strategy,
and the exclusion restrictions in (17) can be statistically tested.
4.3 Statistical Analysis
To answer the main question of interest, i.e. whether the initial eﬀects ma-
trix B as in (19) is supported by the data, we proceed as follows. Following
the benchmark paper, lag length of one is selected according to the Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC). We ﬁrst estimate an unrestricted Risk Appetite
VAR(1) model with variable ordering (18) assuming that the error term ut
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follows a mixture of normal distributions as in (7). The estimation results
are reported in Table 2.5 In this case identiﬁcation is obtained with a dis-
tributional assumption, and the restrictions in (17) become over-identifying
if the ψi's are distinct. Therefore we ﬁrst need to ensure that a statisti-
cal identiﬁcation of the shocks has been obtained. Although the standard
errors in Table 2 indicate a fairly good estimation precision, pairwise equal-
ity of the ψi's has been tested with Wald tests. Since the estimators have
the usual normal limiting distributions, the Wald tests have asymptotic χ2-
distributions. The null hypothesis and the resulting p-values are listed in
Table 4 . The ﬁrst column shows that the equality of all ψi's can be rejected
at the 5 % signiﬁcance level and hence statistical identiﬁcation of shocks has
been obtained.
Now a statistical test of the exclusion restrictions used by Adrian et al.
(2010) can be performed. To this end we next estimate a restricted model
by imposing the recursive ordering (17).6 The statistical test then takes the
form of a simple LR test, which has an asymptotic χ2(N) distribution, where
N is the number of restrictions. The hypotheses are H0: restricted B and
H1: unrestricted B. The estimation results together with the LR test value
(computed assuming N= 10) and the associated p-value are also reported
in the second column of Table 2 . As the LR-test rejects the H0 at all
signiﬁcance levels, we conclude that the restrictions are not compatible with
the data. Note that the Wald tests for the restricted model in the second
column of Table 4 reveal that the pairwise equality of ψ1and ψ2 or ψ3 and
ψ4 cannot be rejected, which implies that the LR statistic has less than 10
degrees of freedom. Given the high value for the LR, it still leads to rejection.
As pointed out in Section 4.2, a challenge that arises from the variable
ordering (18) is that no feedback eﬀect from the right to the left within
the same quarter is allowed. Since our method essentially allows us to test,
whether the statistically identiﬁed shocks satisfy any recursive ordering, we
5The computations were done with GAUSS programs. To compute the ML estimates,
the BHHH procedure of the Gauss CMLMT library was used. In a ﬁrst step, VAR coef-
ﬁcients were estimated from a linear model. In a second step, these estimates were used
as starting values to estimate the parameters of the unrestricted model with a mixed nor-
mal distribution. Finally, the parameter estimates of the unrestricted model were used as
starting values of the restricted model. To ensure nonsingularity of the covariance matri-
ces, their determinants are bounded away from zero. Also the diagonal elements of the Ψ
matrix are bounded away from zero.
6In practice this is done with restrictions on the W matrix in B = W (γIn+(1−γ)Ψ)1/2.
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can order the variables as
yt = (pit, FFRt,mrpt, F It,4gdpt)′ (19)
In (19) the ordering of FFRt (Federal Funds target rate), mrpt (macro risk
premium) and FIt (ﬁnancial intermediary risk appetite) still conforms with
the theory, while the inclusion of 4gdpt (quarterly GDP growth) and pit (in-
ﬂation) is again justiﬁed to avoid omitted variable bias. The main diﬀerence
with (18) is that now changes in the price of risk and ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries' risk appetite are allowed to aﬀect economic ﬂuctuations within the
same quarter already. The generally accepted view that changes in mone-
tary policy are reﬂected in GDP growth earlier than in inﬂation holds here as
well. The estimation results for this model are shown on the right hand side
of Table 2. Again, p-values of pairwise equality tests of the ψi's are shown in
Table 4 . The LR test indicates that the H0: restricted B cannot be rejected
even at the 10 % signiﬁcance level. Once again taking into account that the
equality of ψ3 and ψ4 cannot be rejected, there is still no strong evidence
against the imposed restrictions. Therefore we conclude that the data at
hand does not strongly object to a recursive ordering implied by (19). In-
ability to reject (19) simply tells us that during the sample period monetary
policy has been promptly transmitted from the ﬁnancial sector to the real
economy. As the columns of a triangular matrix cannot be permuted, the
ordering of the shocks corresponds to the lower-triangular B -matrix so that
the statistically identiﬁed shocks can be economically labelled in line with
the ordering in equation (19).
4.4 Robustness Check
To analyze the sensitivity of the results with respect to the proxy variables
being used, the models were additionally estimated with an alternative risk
premium measure, the Excess Bond Premium (ebp) of Gilchrist and Za-
krajsek (2012). The ebp variable has been constructed to capture cyclical
changes in the relationship between measured default risk and credit changes,
and an increase in the excess bond premium reﬂects a reduction in the ef-
fective risk-bearing capacity of the ﬁnancial sector (Gilchrist and Zakrajsek
2012, 2), and is therefore suitable for our purposes. The estimation proce-
dure is as in Section 4.3. The model with the ebp variable was ﬁrst estimated
with variable ordering as in Adrian et al. (2010), or (18), and then according
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to (19). The estimation results are reported in Table 3. Given the high value
of the LR in the ﬁrst case, the test rejects the imposed restrictions at all
signiﬁcance levels even if some of the ψi's were identical. Also in the second
case some of the ψi's may not be distinct, which would decrease the p-value
of LR-test. One would still not be able to reject the restrictions at usual
signiﬁcance levels. As these results conform perfectly with those of the base-
line case, we conclude that the results are robust to the alternative proxy
variable.
4.5 Model Diagnostic
In models based on mixtures of distributions, statistical tests based on con-
ventional residuals cannot be used to check the model speciﬁcation. In these
cases, Kalliovirta (2012) proposes a test based on quantile residuals, which
are obtained by two transformations of the estimated residuals. First, the es-
timated cumulative distribution function (CDF) implied by the model is used
to transform the observations into approximately independent, uniformly dis-
tributed random variables. Second, the inverse of the CDF of the standard
normal distribution is used to get variables that are approximately indepen-
dent with standard normal distribution.
These results assume that the model is correctly speciﬁed and param-
eters consistently estimated. Therefore quantile residuals, that exhibit de-
partures from these properties, provide evidence of model misspeciﬁcation.
This approach has been generalized to multivariate models in Kalliovirta and
Saikkonen (2010), where tests based on univariate joint quantile residuals are
developed. Model misspeciﬁcation can then be detected with normality, au-
tocorrelation and conditional heteroskedasticity tests of the joint quantile
residuals.
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Figure 1: Joint quantile residuals, QQ plot
Figure 1 shows the QQ-plot of the joint quantile residuals obtained from
the mixture VAR. Apart from a few outliers at both tails, the normality
assumption seems to hold reasonably well. A formal test of normality yields
a p-value of 0.38, while autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity tests for dif-
ferent lags range from 0.23 to 0.90 and from 0.18 to 0.99, respectively. As a
conclusion, the diagnositc tests provide clear support for our model speciﬁ-
cation, where a mixed-normal distribution is assumed.
4.6 Impulse Response Analysis
Given that economically meaningful shocks have been identiﬁed, impulse
responses (IRs) based on the VAR(1) model with nonnormal residuals can be
computed. Because of the diﬃculties with the optimization of the likelihood
funtion, conﬁdence intervals for the IRs cannot be easily computed with
classical residual based bootstrap methods. As documented in Herwartz and
Lütkepohl (2014), one has to ensure that only bootstrap replications in the
area of the parameter space of the original estimation step are considered,
and the same sign and ordering of the shocks is preserved. To this end, the
diagonal elements of Ψ and the transition probability γ are not subjected to
resampling. Bootstrap IRs are obtained by nonlinear optimization of the log-
likelihood with linear estimates as starting values. The bootstrap conﬁdence
intervals are the 16th and 84th quantiles of 1000 bootstrap replications.
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Finally we are ready to analyze the macro eﬀects of changing risk percep-
tions and risk tolerance by ﬁnancial intermediaries. The IRs most important
from the point of view of the mechanism of interest are displayed in Figure
3 together with 68 % bootstrap conﬁdence intervals.
The ﬁrst picture in Figure 3 shows that a unit shock to ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries' risk appetite has a positive impact on GDP growth and the eﬀect
lasts for several quarters. Based on the theory, a way to interpret this is that
when ﬁnancial intermediaries more easily obtain funding, they increase the
supply of credit, which contributes to higher GDP growth.
The second picture in the ﬁrst row plots the response of risk appetite
to a positive monetary policy shock. The IR would suggest that a sudden
monetary policy tighteting decreases intermediaries' risk appetite for several
periods, but given the wideness of the conﬁdence bands, one has to conclude
that the sign and magnitude of the reaction is ambiguous.
The ﬁrst picture in the bottom row displays the response of macro risk
premium to a positive risk appetite shock. Again, given the broadness of the
conﬁdence bands, no clear-cut conclusions about the sign of the eﬀect can be
made.
Finally, plotted in the second picture of the bottom row is the negative
eﬀect on GDP growth of a higher macro risk premium. As the macro risk
premium measures the hurdle rate of return required to ﬁnance new projects
in the economy, this can be interpreted as tighter credit conditions having
an adverse eﬀect on GDP growth.
To sum up, changes in either ﬁnancial intermediaries' risk appetite or
the macro risk premium are found to aﬀect economic activity measured by
quarterly GDP growth. However, there is no strong evidence in favor of a
positive and signiﬁcant reaction of ﬁnancial intermediaries' risk appetite to
lax monetary policy during the sample period. Also macro risk premiums
do not appear to be signiﬁcantly driven by ﬁnancial intermediaries' balance
sheet adjustment as measured by the risk appetite factor. The last two
observations are in contradicton with the predictions of the underlying theory
on the risk-taking channel and the previous empirical study. Although some
of the bootstrap conﬁdence bands shown here are relatively large, they tend
to give a more precise picture of the estimation uncertainty of the coeﬃcients
in a small sample.
As a conclusion, the balance sheet adjustment by ﬁnancial intermediaries
and ﬂuctuations in the price of risk have both separately contributed to
economic ﬂuctuations during the sample period, but the link between the
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two and monetary policy is found to be weak.
5 Conclusions
In this paper the macroeconomic eﬀects of the risk-taking channel of mon-
etary policy are empirically analyzed by reconsidering the VAR study of
Adrian et al. (2010). As proposed by Lanne and Lütkepohl (2010) , statisti-
cal properties of the data are exploited to identify shocks needed to study dy-
namic relationships between the variables without imposing any restrictions.
Even though the Lanne and Lütkepohl (2010) method only guarantees a sta-
tistical identiﬁcation i.e. it delivers orthogonalized shocks without attaching
economic labels to them, the method allows us to perform a statistical test
and ﬁnd a recursive ordering that is not rejected by the data.
Being able to identify a previously unidentiﬁed nonstructural VAR model
allows to check the interpretation in Adrian et al. that, in the US, monetary
policy can aﬀect the balance-sheet management of ﬁnancial itermediaries,
the determination of risk premiums, and eventually the level of real activity.
Although the resulting impulse responses are similar to those reported
by Adrial et al., the wideness of the conﬁdence bounds does not allow us
to conclude that there is strong and signiﬁcant evidence in support of the
risk-taking channel. The conﬁdence bounds are obtained from bootstrap esti-
mates of a more complex empirical model based on nonnormality of residuals.
Although the downside of the complexity is that it makes estimation com-
putationally intensive, it is expected to yield better results for two reasons.
First, because the nonnormality of residuals is a feature encountered in the
data, estimation is based on a more realistic assumption. Second, the boot-
strap method should improve the precision of the conﬁdence intervals in a
small sample like the one analyzed here.
As a conclusion, according to the impulse response analysis based on
the statistically identiﬁed shocks, there is no strong evidence in favor of a
positive and signiﬁcant reaction of ﬁnancial intermediaries' risk appetite to
lax monetary policy during the sample period. Also risk premiums in the
economy do not appear to be signiﬁcantly driven by ﬁnancial intermediaries'
balance sheet adjustment as measured by the risk appetite factor. These
observations are in contradicton with the predictions of the underlying theory
on the risk-taking channel and the benchmark empirical study.
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Appendix A. Description of market-based ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries
The following description of market-based ﬁnancial intermediaries is for the
most part a direct quatiation from the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
5.1 Issuers of asset-backed securities (ABS)
ABS issuers are special purpose vehicles (SPVs) that hold pools of assets
(usually loans) in trust and use them as collateral for issuance of ABS. Most
of these SPVs are formed by depository institutions, real estate investment
trusts, and ﬁnance companies to move assets oﬀ their balance sheets into
bankruptcy-remote entities. Assets in the pools include home, multifamily,
and commercial mortgages; consumer credit (such as automobile and student
loans and credit card receivables), trade credit, Treasury securities, agency-
and GSE-backed securities, nonﬁnancial business loans securitized by deposi-
tory institutions and ﬁnance companies, and syndicated loans to nonﬁnancial
corporate businesses. Liabilities of this sector are the securities issued by the
SPVs and are typically medium- to long-term corporate bonds and com-
mercial paper. These securities are largely pass-through securities, in which
purchasers receive any interest, amortization and principal payments on the
underlying collateral.
5.2 Finance companies
This sector includes both ﬁnance companies and mortgage companies. Fi-
nance companies are deﬁned as companies in which 50 percent or more of
assets are held in the following types of loan or lease assets: outstanding
balances on real estate, business loans and leases for commercial and indus-
trial purposes, consumer credit and leases for household, family, and other
personal expenditures. Finance companies do not include U.S.-chartered de-
pository institutions, cooperative banks, credit unions, investment banks, or
industrial loan corporations.
26
5.3 Security brokers and dealers
These are ﬁrms that buy and sell securities for a fee, hold an inventory of
securities for resale, or do both. Brokers and dealers are an important link in
the transmission of funds from savers to investors because they are a means of
distributing both new security issues and those being resold on the secondary
market. Dealers in U.S. government securities that stand ready to buy from
or sell to the Federal Reserve System assist in the implementation of mon-
etary policy conducted through open market operations. The major assets
of the sector are collateral repayable from funding corporations in connec-
tion with securities borrowing, securities held for redistribution, and security
credit provided to customers. Operations are ﬁnanced largely by net trans-
actions with parent companies, customer credit balances, security repurchase
agreements, and security credit from private depository institutions.
5.4 Funding corporations
The sector consists of ﬁve types of ﬁnancial institutions and entities: 1.
Subsidiaries of foreign bank and nonbank ﬁnancial ﬁrms that raise funds
in the U.S. commercial paper market and transfer the proceeds to foreign
banking oﬃces in the United States or to foreign parent companies abroad. 2.
Financial holding companies 3. Custodial accounts, which are bookkeeping
entities established to hold cash collateral put up by security dealers to back
securities they borrow to cover short sales and delivery failures. 4. Limited
liability companies, that the Federal Reserve created in the beginning of 2008,
and to which loans were extended to help stabilize the ﬁnancial system.
5. Loans extended by the federal government to the Term Asset-Backed
Securities Loan Facility, and to funds associated with the Public-Private
Investment Program.
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Appendix B. Tables and ﬁgures
Figure 2: Residuals of the linear VAR(1) model, QQ plot
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yt = (4gdpt, pit, FFRt,mrpt, F It)′ yt = (pit, FFRt,mrpt, F It,4gdpt)′
Parameter Unrestricted B Restricted B Unrestricted B Restricted B
γˆ 0.801 (0.042) 0.866 (0.035) 0.438 (0.060) 0.408 (0.074)
ψˆ1 0.310 (0.118) 0.306 (0.205) 2.043 (0.734) 1.233 (0.507)
ψˆ2 0.044 (0.018) 0.057 (0.028) 0.078 (0.025) 0.083 (0.032)
ψˆ3 0.003 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001) 0.140 (0.054) 0.298 (0.102)
ψˆ4 0.006 (0.002) 0.0034 (0.0016) 0.049 (0.017) 0.075 (0.023)
ψˆ5 2.094 (0.811) 1.976 (1.180) 0.307 (0.102) 0.198 (0.101)
max lT (θ) 255.067 228.083 248.891 241.008
LR 53.968 15.766
p-value 0.0000 0.1065
NOTE: Standard errors in parenthesis are obtained from the inverse Hessian of the log-
likelihood function.
LR = 2(log LT - log L
r
T ) where L
r
T denotes the maximum likelihood under H0: restricted B
and LT denotes the maximum likelihood for the model under H1: unrestricted B . p-values
were computed assuming asymptotic χ2(10) distribution for the LR test statistic.
Table 2: Estimation results for the VAR(1) model with nonnormal residuals
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yt = (4gdpt, pit, FFRt, EBPt, F It)′ yt = (pit, FFRt, EBPt, F It,4gdpt)′
Parameter Unrestricted B Restricted B Unrestricted B Restricted B
γˆ 0.551 (0.057) 0.438 (0.145) 0.551 (0.058) 0.512 (0.063)
ψˆ1 0.511 (0.179) 0.530 (0.344) 1.335 (0.426) 0.910 (0.315)
ψˆ2 0.089 (0.030) 0.381 (0.197) 0.089 (0.030) 0.078 (0.028)
ψˆ3 0.026 (0.009) 0.155 (0.000) 0.079 (0.025) 0.068 (0.024)
ψˆ4 0.079 (0.024) 0.070 (0.044) 0.026 (0.009) 0.078 (0.025)
ψˆ5 1.335 (0.426) 1.264 (2.197) 0.511 (0.185) 0.639 (0.253)
max lT (θ) 191.488 165.528 191.488 184.646
LR 51.92 13.68
p-value 0.0000 0.1881
NOTE: Standard errors in parenthesis are obtained from the inverse Hessian of the log-
likelihood function.
LR = 2(log LT - log L
r
T ) where L
r
T denotes the maximum likelihood under H0: restricted B
and LT denotes the maximum likelihood for the model under H1: unrestricted B . p-values
were computed assuming asymptotic χ2(10) distribution for the LR test statistic.
Table 3: Robustess of the estimation results for the VAR(1) model with
nonnormal residuals to an alternative proxy variable.
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yt = (4gdpt, pit, FFRt,mrpt, F It)′ yt = (pit, FFRt,mrpt, F It,4gdpt)′
H0 Unrestricted B Restricted B Unrestricted B Restricted B
ψ1 = ψ2 0.024 0.152 0.007 0.023
ψ1 = ψ3 0.009 0.089 0.001 0.065
ψ1 = ψ4 0.001 0.090 0.007 0.022
ψ1 = ψ5 1.22e-051 1.93e-015 0.018 0.041
ψ2 = ψ3 0.023 0.049 0.013 1.83e-011
ψ2 = ψ4 0.035 0.054 0.246 0.803
ψ2 = ψ5 0.000 0.000 5.19e-020 0.000
ψ3 = ψ4 0.003 0.317 0.092 0.029
ψ3 = ψ5 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.327
ψ4 = ψ5 0.000 0.000 5.06e-052 8.9e-008
Table 4: p-values of Wald tests for equality of ψi's for models from Table 2
yt = (4gdpt, pit, FFRt, EBPt, F It)′ yt = (pit, FFRt, EBPt, F It,4gdpt)′
H0 Unrestricted B Restricted B Unrestricted B Restricted B
ψ1 = ψ2 0.018 0.665 0.003 0.008
ψ1 = ψ3 0.007 0.276 0.003 0.008
ψ1 = ψ4 0.016 0.181 0.002 0.008
ψ1 = ψ5 4.16e-006 0.033 0.053 0.389
ψ2 = ψ3 0.036 0.251 0.739 0.721
ψ2 = ψ4 0.739 0.114 0.036 1.000
ψ2 = ψ5 0.000 7.39e-006 6.09e-045 2.69e-089
ψ3 = ψ4 3.89e-0.09 0.000 0.034 0.677
ψ3 = ψ5 0.000 0.000 6.65e-067 4.07e-125
ψ4 = ψ5 0.000 3.66e-162 0.000 1.60e-111
Table 5: p-values of Wald tests for equality of ψi's for models from Table 3
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Figure 3: Impulse responses based on the VAR(1) model with nonnormal
residuals and restricted B with 68 % bootstrap conﬁdence intervals from
1000 replications.
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